Introduction
The law relating to limitation for filing appeals under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 ("CGST Act") has been a recurring source of litigation. Two issues have consistently engaged the attention of appellate authorities and constitutional courts. The first concerns whether the date on which an adjudication order is communicated to the taxpayer should be included while computing the limitation period. The second is whether an appeal filed within the additional condonable period prescribed under Section 107(4) can be rejected as time-barred without examining the explanation for the delay. Recent judicial pronouncements, including the decision of the Orissa High Court in Mahesh Value Products, together with the GST Appellate Tribunal Rules, have significantly clarified these issues and reinforced the principle that procedural provisions should facilitate, rather than defeat, the statutory right of appeal.
Statutory Scheme
Section 107(1) of the CGST Act permits an aggrieved person to file an appeal before the Appellate Authority within three months from the date on which the impugned order is communicated. Section 107(4) further empowers the Appellate Authority to admit an appeal filed within a further period of one month if sufficient cause is shown for the delay. While the statute prescribes the limitation period, it does not expressly lay down the manner in which such period is to be computed. Consequently, the provisions of the General Clauses Act, 1897 assume considerable importance.
Section 9 of the General Clauses Act embodies the settled principle that where a period is prescribed "from" a specified date, the day on which the triggering event occurs must be excluded, and computation must commence from the following day. This principle has consistently governed limitation under various enactments and has now received express recognition in the GST Appellate Tribunal Rules, which provide that the day from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned shall be excluded while computing limitation.
Although the Rules are framed in the context of proceedings before the GST Appellate Tribunal, they merely codify an already well-established rule of statutory interpretation. The same principle necessarily applies while computing limitation for first appeals under Section 107 of the CGST Act.
Exclusion of the Date of Communication
The practical consequence of Section 9 is straight forward. If an adjudication order is communicated on a particular date, that date cannot be treated as the first day of limitation. The statutory period of three months begins only on the succeeding day, and the additional condonable period under Section 107(4) is to be computed accordingly. Any computation that includes the date of communication effectively deprives the appellant of one day of the statutory period and results in an incorrect curtailment of the right of appeal.
This settled principle was recently reaffirmed by the Orissa High Court in Mahesh Value Products Vs Chief Commissioner of CT & GST & Others (Order dated 5 June 2026). The Court held that the date on which the order is communicated must be excluded while computing the limitation period and that an appeal filed after excluding such date cannot be rejected as barred by limitation. The judgment aligns the computation of limitation under the CGST Act with Section 9 of the General Clauses Act and removes uncertainty regarding the commencement of the appeal period.
Determining the Date of Communication
The exclusion principle assumes significance only after identifying the actual date on which the order is communicated to the taxpayer. This issue has generated considerable litigation, particularly where adjudication orders are merely uploaded on the GST portal without separate service through recognised modes.
The Madras High Court in Sharp Tanks and Structurals Private Limited v. Deputy Commissioner GST Appeals & Ors. (Order dated 17 September 2025) held that limitation under Section 107 commences only upon effective communication of the order through recognised modes such as personal delivery, registered post, courier or e-mail. The Court observed that mere uploading of an order on the GST portal does not necessarily constitute effective communication.
A similar approach was adopted by the Rajasthan High Court in M/s Sahil Steels v. State of Rajasthan (Order dated 28 August 2025). The Court held that communication under Section 107 contemplates effective receipt of the order by the assessee and not merely its availability on the GST portal, particularly where the assessee could not access the portal for reasons beyond its control.
These decisions underline that the starting point of limitation is the date of effective communication rather than the mere availability of the order on the portal. However, whether portal uploading alone constitutes valid communication may depend upon the facts of each case and the judicial precedents applicable within the relevant jurisdiction. Taxpayers should therefore preserve documentary evidence showing the date on which the order was actually received or came to their knowledge, as such evidence may prove decisive in disputes relating to limitation.
Judicial Approach to Condonation of Delay
Apart from the computation of limitation, another recurring controversy concerns the scope of the appellate authority's power to condone delay under Section 107(4). The issue received detailed consideration from the Calcutta High Court in S.K. Chakraborty & Sons v. Union of India & Ors. and Mukul Islam v. Assistant Commissioner of Revenue (Order dated 01 December 2023). These decisions emphasise that the discretion conferred upon appellate authorities must be exercised judiciously and not reduced to a mechanical computation of limitation.
In S.K. Chakraborty & Sons, the Calcutta High Court examined the interplay between Section 107 of the CGST Act and Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Division Bench held that, in the absence of an express or implied exclusion, Section 5 would apply to appeals under Section 107 by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. The Court observed that Section 107 neither contains a non-obstante clause nor indicates any legislative intent to exclude the general law relating to condonation of delay. While distinguishing the Supreme Court's decision in Singh Enterprises Vs Commissioner of Central Excise (Order dated 14 December 2007), which arose under the Central Excise Act, the Court adopted an interpretation that advances the statutory right of appeal. However, as divergent judicial views exist, the broader applicability of this principle outside the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court may ultimately depend upon an authoritative pronouncement by the Supreme Court.
The Calcutta High Court further strengthened procedural safeguards in Mukul Islam v. Assistant Commissioner of Revenue (Order dated 01 May 2024). The petitioner had filed an appeal beyond the initial three-month period but within the statutory condonable period, accompanied by an application explaining the delay. The appellate authority rejected the application and dismissed the appeal without adequately considering the explanation. Setting aside the order, the High Court held that where the statute confers discretion to condone delay, such discretion must be exercised on a proper appreciation of the facts. An appeal filed within the condonable period cannot be rejected mechanically without examining whether sufficient cause has been shown. Failure to consider a properly supported application amounts to a failure to exercise the jurisdiction vested in the appellate authority.
Practical Implications
The emerging judicial position offers valuable guidance for taxpayers and tax professionals. First, while computing limitation under Section 107, the date on which the adjudication order is communicated must invariably be excluded, and the limitation period begins only from the following day in accordance with Section 9 of the General Clauses Act. The decision of the Orissa High Court in Mahesh Value Products reinforces this settled position.
Secondly, taxpayers should carefully ascertain the actual date of effective communication of the order rather than relying solely on the date appearing on the GST portal. Wherever possible, documentary evidence regarding the date of receipt should be preserved to avoid disputes relating to limitation.
Thirdly, where an appeal cannot be filed within the prescribed three months but falls within the additional condonable period under Section 107(4), it should invariably be accompanied by a detailed application explaining the reasons for the delay and supported by relevant documents. Appellate authorities are required to consider such applications objectively and record reasons while accepting or rejecting the explanation. Mechanical dismissal of appeals filed within the condonable period undermines the statutory scheme and the principles of natural justice.
Conclusion
The law governing limitation for appeals under Section 107 of the CGST Act has become considerably clearer through the combined operation of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, the GST Appellate Tribunal Rules and the evolving body of High Court jurisprudence. The settled legal position is that the date on which an adjudication order is communicated must be excluded while computing the limitation period, and the statutory clock begins to run only from the succeeding day. Equally important, where an appeal is filed within the condonable period, the appellate authority cannot reject it as time-barred without first considering the explanation for the delay and exercising the discretion conferred by law.
Strict adherence to these principles will reduce avoidable litigation and ensure that procedural rules serve their intended purpose of facilitating, rather than frustrating, the statutory right of appeal. Ultimately, the appellate mechanism under the GST regime is designed to secure adjudication on merits, and not to deny substantive justice through an erroneous or unduly technical computation of limitation.
